The existential/uniqueness presupposition of wh-complements projects from the answers by Uegaki, Wataru
 
 
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The existential/uniqueness presupposition of wh-complements
projects from the answers
Citation for published version:
Uegaki, W 2020, 'The existential/uniqueness presupposition of wh-complements projects from the answers',
Linguistics and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-020-09309-4
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1007/s10988-020-09309-4
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Linguistics and Philosophy
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 06. Nov. 2020
Linguistics and Philosophy
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-020-09309-4
ORIG INAL RESEARCH
The existential/uniqueness presupposition of
wh-complements projects from the answers
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Abstract
Theprojectionpattern of the existential/uniqueness presuppositionof awh-complement
varies depending on the predicate that embeds it. This variation poses problems for
existing accounts that treat the presupposition as a semantic contribution of an operator
merging with the wh-complement (Dayal in Locality in Wh-quantification: questions
and relative clauses in Hindi. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1996) or of the
embedding predicate (Uegaki in Interpreting questions under attitudes. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology PhD dissertation, Cambridge, 2015). I propose that the prob-
lems can be solved if the existential/uniqueness presupposition is contributed by the
propositions corresponding to the answers of the embedded question, under the Ham-
blin/Karttunen semantics for questions.
Keywords Questions · Embedded questions · wh-complements · Presupposition of
questions · Uniqueness presupposition
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the semantic analysis of embedded
questions (e.g., George 2011; Spector and Egré 2015; Uegaki 2015; Cremers 2016;
Xiang 2016; Theiler et al. 2018), following earlier pioneering works (e.g., Karttunen
1977; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984; Heim 1994; Dayal 1996; Lahiri 2002). One of
the primary goals of the investigation in this domain is to provide a unified account of
I would like to thank Lisa Cheng, Ivano Ciardelli, Alexandre Cremers, Danny Fox, James Griffiths, Irene
Heim, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern, Floris Roelofsen, Bernhard Schwarz, Roger Schwarzschild, Rob
Truswell, Alice Turk, as well as anonymous reviewers for Linguistics and Philosophy for helpful
comments and discussion. All errors are my own. This is a substantially revised version of my 2018 paper
‘On the projection of the presupposition of embedded questions’ appeared in Proceedings of Semantics
and Linguistic Theory 28.
B Wataru Uegaki
w.uegaki@ed.ac.uk
1 University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK
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the interpretations of pairs of sentences of the form in (1), where Q is an interrogative
and p is a declarative complement, for different predicates V :
(1) a. x Vs Q (e.g.,Max knows who danced.)
b. x Vs that p (e.g.,Max knows that Pat danced.)
Such a unified account would capture the interpretations of both (1a) and (1b), in terms
of a general compositional mechanism that allows the predicate V to embed either a
declarative or an interrogative complement (see Uegaki 2019 for a recent review).
This paper aims to further advance the investigation into the semantics of these
constructions, focusing on an issue concerning their presuppositions, i.e., how the
presupposition of a wh-complement is projected by different embedding predicates.
At least sinceKatz and Postal (1964), it has been observed thatwh-questions in general
presuppose that at least one of its Hamblin answers (Hamblin 1973) is true. The
following examples illustrate this observation (see also Keenan and Hull 1973 for
early discussion):1
(2) a. Who smokes?
presup⇒ ‘Someone smokes.’ (presup⇒ : ‘presupposes’)
b. Which semanticists danced?
presup⇒ ‘Some semanticist danced.’
(3) a. I am not sure if anyone smokes, but #who smokes?
b. I am not sure if any semanticist danced, but #which semanticist danced?
In addition, it is well known that a singular-which question of the form Which NP
ϕ? presupposes that exactly one NP ϕ (e.g., Dayal 1996; cf. also Groenendijk and
Stokhof 1984):
(4) Which semanticist danced?
presup⇒ ‘Exactly one semanticist danced.’
(5) a. I am not sure if any semanticist danced, but #which semanticist danced?
b. I am not sure how many semanticists danced, but #which semanticist
danced?
I will refer to these presuppositions as the uniqueness/existential presupposition of
wh-questions, or the UP/EP for short.
TheUP/EPpresents an additional desideratum for any unified semantic theory of the
constructions in (1), as envisioned above. That is, the theory has to uniformly account
for the projection behavior of the UP/EP in interrogative-embedding sentences, as in
(6), as well as the presuppositions of their declarative counterparts, as in (7). (I will
discuss each of these data points in detail in Sect. 2):
(6) a. Max knows which semanticist danced.
presup⇒ ‘Exactly one semanticist danced.’
1 Note that the construction in (3) I am not sure if S, but [question] is in principle felicitous if S doesn’t
violate the presupposition of the question, as can be seen in the following:
(i) a. I am not sure if you’d like to tell me this, but who were you speaking to just now?
b. I am not sure if it is appropriate to ask this, but how old are you?
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b. Max is certain (about) which semanticist danced.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that exactly one semanticist danced.’
c. Max agrees with Kim on which semanticist danced.
presup⇒ ‘Max and Kim believe that exactly one semanticist danced.’
(7) a. Max knows that Ash danced.
presup⇒ ‘Ash danced.’
b. Max is certain that Ash danced.
presup⇒ ‘It is compatible with Max’s beliefs that Ash danced.’
c. Max agrees with Kim that Ash danced.
presup⇒ ‘Kim believes that Ash danced.’
In the literature, Karttunen and Peters (1976) offer a pioneering analysis of the
projection of the EP of interrogative complements embedded under know, won-
der and matter. They treat the EP as a ‘conventional implicature’ and formulate a
two-dimensional compositional analysis where both the at-issue content and the con-
ventional implicature are calculated recursively based on the system developed in
Karttunen and Peters (1979). In this system, how the EP (or the existential ‘implica-
ture’ in their terms) is projected by each embedding predicate is stipulated in the form
of meaning postulates. The goal of the current paper departs from that of Karttunen
and Peters (1976) in two important respects. First, although Karttunen and Peters stip-
ulate the projection behavior of the EP for each question-embedding verb, focusing
only on interrogative-embedding sentences, my aim is to offer a unified analysis of
the UP/EP of interrogative-embedding sentences, as in (6), and the presuppositions of
their declarative counterparts, as in (7). Second, I aim to analyze the sentences as in
(6) as semantically presupposing, rather than conventionally implicating, the relevant
uniqueness/existential implications, following the current consensus on the empirical
description of the phenomena (e.g., Dayal 1996; Comorovski 1996 and much subse-
quent literature).2
Dayal (1996) provides a highly influential analysis of the UP/EP in terms of the
maximality presupposition of the answerhood operator.However, as Iwill argue below,
Dayal’s (1996) original account, as well as its possible extensions based on Spector
and Egré (2015) and Uegaki (2015), falls short of providing a unified account of the
UP/EP of interrogative-embedding sentences and the presuppositions of their declar-
ative counterparts. The goal of this paper is thus to offer an alternative analysis that
can uniformly capture both theUP/EP-projection behavior in interrogative-embedding
sentences (e.g., (6))and the presuppositions of the declarative-embedding counterparts
(e.g., (7)). Specifically, assuming the Hamblin/Karttunen semantics for questions, I
will argue that such a unified analysis is possible only if the UP/EP is contributed by
the proposition(s) corresponding to the answer(s) of the question.3
2 Karttunen and Peters (1976) also make an important observation that the existential/uniqueness implica-
tions of matrix questions don’t behave as a typical presupposition in the sense that they can be canceled by
an interlocutor (without hey wait a minute etc.). I address this point in Sect. 4.1.
3 Here, I stay neutral as to whether each proposition in the question denotation contributes the UP/EP or
a single answer of the question (e.g., picked out by an answerhood operator) contributes it. The first one
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It should be made clear at this point that a goal of this paper is not to offer an
argument for a particular compositional mechanism of question-embedding, such as
the question-to-proposition reduction (e.g., Karttunen 1977; Heim 1994; Lahiri 2002;
Spector and Egré 2015), the proposition-to-question reduction (Uegaki 2015), or the
uniform analysis based on Inquisitive Semantics (Theiler et al. 2018). Rather, the
UP/EP proves to be a general problem for existing accounts regardless of the compo-
sitional mechanism for question-embedding. Moreover, the proposed account where
the answer(s) carry the UP/EP is in principle compatible with any of the three general
approaches mentioned above. For the sake of simplicity, I will provide a concrete
account using Spector and Egré’s (2015) question-to-proposition reduction approach,
and discuss an alternative implementation within the proposition-to-question reduc-
tion approach in Appendix B.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, I lay out the basic
data and discuss why they pose problems for existing accounts: Dayal (1996), its pos-
sible extensions based on Spector and Egré (2015) and on Uegaki (2015). Section 3
puts forward my central proposal that the existential/uniqueness presupposition of
wh-complements is contributed by the answers. It is shown that this proposal enables
a proper treatment of the data presented in Sect. 2, given independently motivated
assumptions about (i) the presupposition-projection properties of the embedding predi-
cates and (ii) the general compositional mechanism for question-embedding. Section 4
discusses how the present analysis can be extended to data involving matrix questions
and rogative predicates (e.g., wonder). Section 5 summarizes the proposal and dis-
cusses several open issues.
2 Data and problems for existing accounts
In this section, I present data concerning the projection of the presupposition of wh-
complements, and discuss why they are problematic for the existing accounts byDayal
(1996) as well as for its possible extensions based on Spector and Egré (2015) and on
Uegaki (2015). Here and in the rest of the paper, I willmostly present data involving the
uniqueness presupposition (UP) of singular-which questions. However, the analyses
to be discussed will be compatible with the existential presupposition (EP) of plural-
which and simplex wh-questions, as they are based on Dayal’s (1996) analysis that
uniformly treats both UP and EP as the maximality presupposition, as discussed at the
end of Sect. 2.1.
2.1 Embedding under veridical predicates and Dayal (1996)
When a singular-which question is embedded under a veridical predicate, such as know
and surprise, the uniqueness presupposition (UP) projects to the matrix level. This can
be seen in the following examples:
Footnote 3 continued
of these two possible analyses will be presented in Sect. 3. The second possible analysis is presented in
Appendix A.
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(8) a. Max doesn’t know which student smokes.
b. Does Max know which student smokes?
c. If Max knows which student smokes, she will tell us about it.
presup⇒ ‘Exactly one student smokes.’
(9) a. Max isn’t surprised (about/by) which student smokes.
b. Is Max surprised (about/by) which student smokes?
c. If Max is surprised (about/by) which student smokes, she will tell us about
it.
presup⇒ ‘Exactly one student smokes.’
A proper analysis of the UP/EP we are after has to be able to capture the data in (8)–
(9). In addition, it also has to be able to capture the presuppositions these predicates
exhibit when they embed a declarative complement, as follows:
(10) a. Max doesn’t know that Ash smokes.
b. Does Max know that Ash smokes?
c. If Max knows that Ash smokes, she will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘Ash smokes.’
(11) a. Max isn’t surprised that Ash smokes.
b. Is Max surprised that Ash smokes?
c. If Max is surprised that Ash smokes, she will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘Ash smokes & Max believes that Ash smokes.’
Dayal’s (1996) analysis of the UP employing her answerhood operator straight-
forwardly captures this matrix projection pattern in (8)–(9). In Dayal (1996),
wh-complements obligatorily merge with the answerhood operator, Ans, defined
below.4,5
(12) a. Answ = λQ〈st,t〉 : ∃p ∈ Q[p = Maxinf(Q, w)]. Maxinf(Q, w)
b. Maxinf(Q, w) = p iff w ∈ p ∧ ∀q ∈ Q[w ∈ q → p ⊆ q]
Ans roughly acts as a definite determiner over propositions. It carries the presuppo-
sition that there is a maximally informative true answer in the set of propositions it
combines with, and picks out such a maximally informative true answer. Hereafter, I
will refer to the presupposition of Ans as the maximality presupposition, and the
proposition that theAns-operator returns fromaquestion as theDayal-answer of the
question. Given that a singular-which question denotes a set of mutually-independent
4 The formulation using the predicateMaxinf is from Fox and Hackl (2007).
5 FollowingHeimandKratzer (1998), Imodel presuppositions in terms of partial functionswith the notation
λx : π(x).ϕ(x). Here, π(x) is the domain specification corresponding to the presupposition.
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‘atomic’ answers, as in (13) (cf. Hamblin 1973),6 this treatment captures the UP asso-
ciated with it.7,8
(13) which student smokes 
⎧
⎨
⎩
λw′.studentw′(a)∧smokew′(a),
λw′.studentw′(b)∧smokew′(b),
λw′.studentw′(c)∧smokew′(c)
⎫
⎬
⎭
(= Q)
This is so because, for everyw and every set Q of mutually-independent propositions,
Answ(Q) is defined only if exactly one of Q’s members is true in w. Sentences
like (8)–(9) have a semantic representation like (14)–(15), where Answ(Q) (with the
matrix evaluation world w) serves as an argument of the embedding predicate.
(14) Max knows which student smokes  knoww(m,Answ(Q))
(15) Max is surprised (about/by)which student smokes surprisedw(m,Answ(Q))
The meanings in (14)–(15) are defined only if Answ(Q) is defined, which holds just
in case exactly one student smokes in w, the matrix evaluation world.
The Ans-operator further enables a uniform treatment of the UP of singular-
which questions and the EP of plural/simplex-wh questions, under the assumption
that plural/simplex wh-phrases are number-neutral. This is so since the maximality
presupposition is satisfied for proposition-sets that are closed under conjunction as
long as there is a true answer in the set.9
The presuppositions of the declarative cases in (10)–(11) can also be straightfor-
wardly captured in termsof the proposition-taking lexical denotations of the predicates.
Concretely, assuming that the presuppositions are encoded in the meta-language pred-
icates know and surprise as in (16), we can capture the fact that the meanings of the
declarative-embedding sentences involving these predicates in (17) have the desired
presuppositions.
(16) a. For all w, x and p (which themselves do not have presuppositions),
knoww(x, p) is defined iff p(w)
b. For all w, x and p (which themselves do not have presuppositions),
surprisedw(x, p) is defined iff p(w) ∧ Doxxw ⊆ p
(17) a. Max knows that Ash smokes  knoww(m, A)
b. Max is surprised that Ash smokes  surprisew(m, A)
6 This is so since a morphologically singular NP denotes a set of atomic individuals (Sharvy 1980; Link
1983), and that a which-phrase ‘ranges over’ the denotation of the NP. This results in the set of propositions
corresponding to these atomic individuals as the denotation of the whole clause. This is true both under the
Karttunen-style and under the Hamblin-style compositional semantics for wh-clauses.
7 I assume that a linguistic expression is translated into a formula in an intermediate logical language
similar to Ty2 (Gallin 1975), which then receives a model-theoretic interpretation. I notate ‘S  ϕ’ to
indicate that the sentence S is translated into the formula ϕ.
8 Here, I represent the question denotation as having the ‘de dicto’ reading, with the world index of the
NP-part of the which-phrase bound by the lambda introducing the world-dependence. See Sect. 3.4 for the
compositional derivation of ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’ readings ofwhich-questions followingBeck andRullmann
(1999).
9 See Elliott et al. (2018); Alonso-Ovalle and Rouillard (2019); Xiang (2019); Maldonado (2020) for recent
discussion on the role of the morphosyntactic number of wh-phrases in the semantics of wh-questions and
its relation to the so-called ‘higher-order’ readings.
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2.2 Embedding under non-veridical predicates
The UP/EP exhibits a different projection behavior when the wh-complement is
embedded under non-veridical predicates from when it is embedded under veridical
predicates. The examples in (18) illustrate that, when be certain embeds a singular-
which complement, the UP does not necessarily project to the matrix level, but rather
projects into the subject’s beliefs.
(18) a. Max is certain (about) which student smokes.
b. Max isn’t certain (about) which student smokes.
c. Is Max certain (about) which student smokes?
d. If Max is certain (about) which student smokes, she will let us know.
presup
 ‘Exactly one student smokes.’
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that exactly one student smokes.’
The contrast between know and be certain with respect to the relevant presupposi-
tion projection behavior is also clear in the following minimal pair.10
(19) No student smokes. But, Max believes that there is a student smoker. Only, he
{isn’t certain / #doesn’t know} which student smokes.
The following is an attested example where, given the context, it is reasonable to
assume that the presupposition of thewhich-question under be certain does not project
to the matrix level, but only to the beliefs of the subject.
(20) Every blinking light, every bell and everyChristmas carol has a beauty to a child
which we are unable to remember. So, what if the lights blow a fuse? Does it
reallymatter if the bells are a little bit dented or not in tune?Who cares if you’ve
heard the same song 500 times? Even if you see a dozen Santas in a day, every
new meeting with Santa Claus is special. Santa Claus can’t be everywhere so
he has helpers (of course!), but how can a child be certain which Santa is real?
It isn’t possible, so he or she treats them all with equal awe and love.11
presup
 ‘Exactly one Santa is real.’
presup⇒ ‘A child believes that exactly one Santa is real.’
Another non-veridical predicate, agree, exhibits a slightly different presupposition
projection behavior, as illustrated in the following examples:
10 M. Erlewine (p.c.) pointed out to me that there seems to be a contrast between the projection patterns
of the existential implication and the ‘less than two’ implication in (18). That is, although (18) sounds
felicitous when there is in fact no student smoker (as long as Max believes that there is a student smoker), it
sounds infelicitous when there are more than one student smokers. If it turns out that this judgment can be
replicated systematically, the discussion in this paper should be viewed as concerning only the existential
presupposition of wh-complements. At the same time, we would need an independent analysis of the ‘less
than two’ implication that predicts matrix projection.
11 The Lafayette Vol. 114, No. 12. URL: http://digital.lafayette.edu/collections/newspaper/19871127/pdf
(accessed on July 17, 2018).
123
W. Uegaki
(21) a. Max agrees with Kim on which student smokes.
b. Max doesn’t agree with Kim on which student smokes.
c. Does Max agree with Kim on which student smokes?
d. If Max agrees with Kim on which student smokes, she will let us know.
presup
 ‘Exactly one student smokes.’
presup⇒ ‘Max and Kim believe that exactly one student smokes.’
These examples show that the UP of the embedded question is projected not only to
the belief state of the subject (Max in (21)) but also to the belief state of the individual
denoted by the with-phrase (henceforth the with-argument; Kim in (21)).12 The
presupposition, however, is not necessarily projected to thematrix level. The examples
in (21) can be felicitous even if there is in fact no, or more than one, student smokers.
Again, our goal is to have an analysis that accounts for the projection of the UP/EP
as illustrated above, as well as the presuppositional behaviors of the relevant predicates
when they embed declarative complements. The latter is illustrated in the following
examples for be certain and agree:
(22) a. Max is certain that Ash smokes.
b. Max isn’t certain that Ash smokes.
c. Is Max certain that Ash smokes?
d. If Max is certain that Ash smokes, she will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘It is compatible with Max’s beliefs that Ash smokes.’13
(23) a. Max agrees with Kim that Ash smokes.
b. Max doesn’t agree with Kim that Ash smokes.
c. Does Max agree with Kim that Ash smokes?
d. If Max agrees with Kim that Ash smokes, she will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘Kim believes Ash smokes.’
In the following three subsections, we will consider ways to extend the basic analysis
by Dayal (1996) introduced in the previous section to the non-veridical predicates.
12 More precisely, the presupposition concerning Kim’s beliefs is stronger than what is stated in (21). That
is, the sentences presuppose that there is exactly one student such that Kim believes that they smoke. The
same does not hold for the presupposition concerning Max’s beliefs. Since the weaker formulation of the
presupposition in (21) suffices in the illustration of problems for existing analyses to be given below, I will
stick to the weaker formulation in this section for the sake of simplicity. I will argue in Sect. 3.3.2 that my
ultimate analysis captures the asymmetric presuppositions with respect to Max’s beliefs and Kim’s beliefs
in the examples in (21).
13 Onemight have the impression that x is certain that p presupposes ‘x believes that p’. As long as we have
the Hintikkan semantics for belief, i.e., truth of the proposition in all of the subject’s doxastic alternatives,
the data suggest that be certain doesn’t presuppose belief. This is so because (22b) and (22c) clearly do not
entail Max believes that Ash smokes in the Hintikkan sense. This still leaves open the possibility that be
certain presupposes a weaker notion of belief, e.g., thinking the proposition likely (e.g. Hawthorne et al.
2016). As discussed in fn. 16 below, assuming this type of presupposition for be certain doesn’t affect
my argument against the analysis of the projection of the UP/EP from under be certain considered here.
Moreover, it does not affect my argument concerning agree below either.
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2.3 A simple-minded account: always anchoring ANS to the evaluation world
The analysis in terms ofDayal’s (1996)Ans-operator outlined in Sect. 2.1 only consid-
ered embedding under veridical predicates. To extend this line of account to embedding
under question-embedding predicates in general (including non-veridical predicates),
we need to assume a general compositional mechanism for question-embedding. Let
us first consider a very simple such mechanism, stated below:
(24) The simple ANS-based semantics for question-embedding:
For any term α, interrogative complement ϕ and a question-embedding predi-
cate V , α Vs ϕ  V(Answ(ϕ))(α)
where V, α, and ϕ are translations of V , α, and ϕ, respectively.
According to this analysis, regardless of the semantics of the embedding predicate,
embedded questions are interpretedwithAns evaluatedwith respect to thematrix eval-
uation world. This means that the predicted interpretation would involve the ‘actual’
answer (relative to the evaluation world) no matter what the embedding predicate is.
Among other issues, such an analysis would incorrectly predict the UP to project to
the matrix level even when the embedding predicate is non-veridical. For example,
the embedding under be certain would be analyzed as follows:
(25) Max is certain about which student smokes  certainw(m,Answ(Q))
Just as in the case with veridical predicates, the predicted meaning in (25) is defined
only ifAnsw(Q) is defined, which in turn holds just in case exactly one student smokes
in the matrix evaluation world w. Thus, this treatment fails to capture the lack of the
matrix projection of the UP, as well as its projection to the subject’s beliefs observed in
(18). Similarly, the projection behavior of agree would be problematic. The analysis
would treat question-embedding under agree as follows:
(26) Max agrees with Kim on which student smokes  agreew(m, k,Answ(Q))
Just as in (25), the analysis predicts the matrix projection, and no projection to the
subject’s or to the with-argument’s beliefs.
In sum, the varying projection behavior of the UP/EP across veridical and non-
veridical predicates cannot be captured by a simple extension of Dayal’s (1996)
analysis, where embedded questions are always interpreted with Ans evaluated with
respect to the matrix evaluation world. Such an analysis predicts the presupposition
triggered by Ans to project to the matrix level regardless of the embedding predicate.
In order to resolve this problem, we need a mechanism that allows us to let the
projection of the presupposition triggered by Ans vary depending on the embedding
predicate. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to this issue: an approach based
on the proposition-oriented semantics and an approach based on the question-oriented
semantics for the relevant embedding predicates. The former approach would encode
the presuppositional behaviors of the predicates when they embed declarative com-
plements in their proposition-taking lexical denotations, and attempt to capture the
projection of the UP/EP when they embed interrogative complements, given the lex-
ical denotations together with a compositional mechanism for question-embedding.
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The latter approach would directly encode how the predicates project the presuppo-
sition when they embed interrogative complements in their lexical denotations, and
attempt to capture their presuppositional behavior when they take declarative com-
plements, given the lexical denotations together with a compositional mechanism that
enables question-taking predicate meanings to embed declarative complements.
In the following two subsections, we consider two extensions of the Dayal-style
analysis within these two approaches: one based on the proposition-oriented semantics
by Spector and Egré (2015) (Sect. 2.4) and the other based on question-oriented
semantics by Uegaki (2015) (Sect. 2.5). As it turns out, both analyses fail to achieve
a unified analysis of the presuppositions in declarative-embedding and interrogative-
embedding sentences.
2.4 An extension based on Spector and Egré (2015)
Spector and Egré (2015) propose a proposition-oriented semantics for question-
embedding that is designed to address issues surrounding non-veridical predicates,
such as be certain and agree. In contrast to the naïve extension of Dayal (1996) consid-
ered in the previous section, where the embedded question is always analyzed in terms
of its unique true answer in the matrix evaluation world, Spector and Egré (2015) ana-
lyze question-embedding as involving existential quantification over possible answers.
Making use of Dayal’s answerhood operator, this analysis can be schematically stated
as follows:
(27) Spector and Egré-style ANS-based semantics for question-embedding:
For any term α, interrogative complement ϕ and a question-embedding predi-
cate V , α Vs ϕ  ∃w′[V(Answ′(ϕ))(α)]
where V, α, and ϕ are translations of V , α, and ϕ, respectively.
More precisely, Spector and Egré (2015) posit a lexical rule converting a proposition-
taking denotation, Vdecl , of a predicate V into its question-taking counterpart. Using
Ans, their rule looks like the following:14
(28) Vint = λQ〈st,t〉λxeλws : ∃w′[Vdecl(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(x)(w) is defined].
∃w′[Vdecl(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(x)(w) is defined∧Vdecl(Answ′(Q))(x)(w)]
(29) ExhQ(p) := λw.[Answ(Q) = p] (Spector and Egré 2015, 1747; cf. Heim 1994)
According to this analysis, roughly, x Vs Q asserts that there is a world w′ such
that ‘x V s Answ′(Q)’ is true, while presupposing that the presupposition of ‘x V s the
exhaustification of Answ′(Q)’ can be satisfied.15
14 Spector and Egré (2015) also posit a variant of this lexical rule where the answer in the assertive
condition is also exhaustified, in order to capture the strongly-exhaustive reading. Also, here, I gloss over
issues concerning the presuppositional monotonicity and the ‘sensitivity to false answers’ discussed in
Sections 6 and 7 of Spector and Egré (2015). This simplification does not affect the argument here.
15 According to this rule, the answerhood in the presupposition always involves Exh, i.e., it is
‘strongly-exhaustive’, even if the answerhood in the assertion is ‘weakly-exhaustive’. This is based on
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For instance, sentences involving know/be certain and a singular-which question
are analyzed as follows:
(30) a. Max knows which student smokes 
λws : ∃w′[knoww(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(m) is defined].
∃w′[knoww(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(m) is defined ∧ knoww(Answ′(Q))(m)]
b. Max is certain (about) which student smokes 
λws : ∃w′[certainw(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(m) is defined].
∃w′[certainw(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(m) is defined ∧ certainw(Answ′(Q))(m)]
This analysis makes different predictions regarding the projection of the UP from
the simple analysis sketched in the previous section. In particular, it is predicted that
predicates varywith respect to how they project theUP/EP, given that their proposition-
taking denotations (e.g., know, certain) have different presuppositional properties. I
repeat the examples illustrating these properties for know and be certain below:
(10) a. Max knows that Ash smokes.
b. Max doesn’t know that Ash smokes.
c. Does Max know that Ash smokes?
d. If Max knows that Ash smokes, she will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘Ash smokes.’
(22) a. Max is certain that Ash smokes.
b. Max isn’t certain that Ash smokes.
c. Is Max certain that Ash smokes?
d. If Max is certain that Ash smokes, she will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘It is compatible with Max’s beliefs that Ash smokes.’
Given these presuppositional behaviors of know and be certain, we assume that the
meta-language predicates know and certain have the following presuppositions:
(31) For all w, p and x (which themselves do not have presuppositions),
a. knoww(p)(x) is defined iff p(w) (factivity)
b. certainw(p)(x) is defined iff p ∩ Doxxw = ∅
Now, we return to (30)—the predicted meanings of know/be certain-wh sentences.
To see what the predicted presuppositions underlined in (30) amount to, we have to
consider both the presupposition triggered byAns and that triggered by the predicates
know/certain. As a result, the predicted presuppositions in (30) can be rewritten as
follows:
Footnote 15 continued
Spector and Egré’s observation that emotive factives like surprise, which is typically associated with a
weakly-exhaustive answer in their assertion involves a strongly exhaustive reading in the presupposition
(Spector and Egré 2015, 1762–1764).
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(32) a. ∃w′[knoww(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(m) is defined]
⇔ ∃w′[ Answ′(Q) is defined︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. triggered by Ans
∧ ExhQ(Answ′(Q))(w)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. triggered by know
]
b. ∃w′[certainw(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(m) is defined]
⇔ ∃w′[ Answ′(Q) is defined︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. triggered by Ans
∧ExhQ(Answ′(Q)) ∩ Doxmw = ∅︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. triggered by certain
]
Let us consider (32a) and (32b) in turn. First, the predicted presupposition for Max
knows which student smokes in (32a) states that ‘there is a world such that the Dayal-
answer in that world is defined and the exhaustification of that answer is true in the
evaluation world (w)’. This correctly predicts that the UP is satisfied in the evaluation
world because the exhaustification of Answ′(Q) for any w′ states that exactly one
student smokes.
Turning to (32b), i.e., the predicted presupposition ofMax is certain (about) which
student smokes, we have ‘there is a world such that the Dayal-answer in that world
is defined and the exhaustification of that answer is compatible with Max’s beliefs in
the evaluation world (w)’. This does not predict matrix projection of the UP, unlike
the simple extension of Dayal’s analysis. This is empirically correct. However, it does
not predict that Max believes the UP. Crucially, the UP triggered by Ans does not
project to Max’s belief state in (32b) since the argument of certain, i.e., Answ′(Q),
itself is not partial when it is defined. Instead, (32b) only predicts that Max’s beliefs
are compatiblewith some exhaustified Dayal-answer. This predicted presupposition is
too weak in view of the empirical pattern we observed in the previous subsection. The
predicted presupposition would be satisfied if, for example, Max considers it possible
that only Ash smokes, but also considers it possible that no one smokes.16
Essentially the same problem arises with agree. A sentence with agree embedding
an interrogative complement would be analyzed as follows in the S&E-style analysis:
(33) Max agrees with Kim on which student smokes 
λws : ∃w′[agreew(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(k)(m) is defined].
∃w′[agreew(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(k)(m) is defined ∧ agreew(Answ′(Q))(k)(m)]
Again, to see what the presupposition in (33) amounts to, we have to consider the
presupposition of the proposition-taking denotation of agree...with.... This is tested as
in the following examples, repeated from above:
(23) a. Max agrees with Kim that Ash smokes.
b. Max doesn’t agree with Kim that Ash smokes.
c. Does Max agree with Kim that Ash smokes?
d. If Max agrees with Kim that Ash smokes, he will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘Kim believes Ash smokes.’
16 If certainw(p)(x) presupposes that x thinks p likely (see fn. 13 above), the predicted presupposition
in (32b) would be that Max thinks some exhaustified Dayal-answer likely. This prediction still seems too
weak, as it would be satisfied even if Max doesn’t rule out the possibility that no student smokes.
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Based on these data, we can assume that x agrees with y that p presupposes that
y believes that p. We assume that this is encoded in agree, as follows:
(34) For all w, p, x and y (which themselves do not have presuppositions),
agreew(p)(y)(x) is defined iff Dox
y
w ⊆ p
With this, the underlined presupposition in (33) can be rewritten as follows:
(35) ∃w′[agreew(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(k)(m) is defined]
⇔ ∃w′[ Answ′(Q) is defined︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. triggered by Ans
∧ Doxkw ⊆ ExhQ(Answ′(Q))︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. triggered by agree
]
Again, this does not amount to a matrix projection of the UP. To this extent, the
prediction is correct. However, the account fails to capture the fact that the UP projects
to the attitude holder Max’s beliefs, as (35) only predicts that the UP projects to Kim’s
beliefs.
In sum, S&E’s analysis is designed to address some of the issues surrounding
non-veridical question-embedding predicates. In particular, employing their analysis,
the presupposition projection behavior of the predicates with respect to declarative
complements can be used to make predictions about how the UP/EP is projected
when the predicates embed wh-complements. However, it fails to completely capture
the projection pattern of the UP/EP with non-veridical predicates. In particular, the
analysis fails to capture the fact that the UP/EP projects to the attitude holder’s beliefs
with be certain and agree.
2.5 An extension based on Uegaki (2015)
The approach considered in the previous section treated the presuppositional behaviors
of the predicates when they embed declarative complements as given (i.e., something
that must be encoded in their lexical semantics) and attempted to derive the projection
of the UP/EP based on them. In this section, we consider an opposite approach, i.e.,
the approach that treats the behaviors of the predicates when they embed interrogative
complements as given, and attempts to derive their presuppositional behavior when
they embed declarative complements.
Uegaki (2015) offers such an approach to the presuppositional behavior of question-
embedding predicates, formulatedwithin his question-oriented semantics for question-
embedding. Specifically, in Uegaki (2015), the predicates’ varying projection behavior
with respect to the UP/EP is captured by letting the predicate meanings relate the
subject’s attitude representation to the Dayal-answer of a question in different ways.
This is done by treating Ans as a part of the predicate meaning. Specifically, know
and be certain are analyzed as follows:
(36) a. know  λQ〈st,t〉λxe.knoww(x,Answ(Q))
b. be certain  λQ〈st,t〉λxe.∀v[v∈Doxxw → Doxxw ⊆ Ansv(Q)]
Let us consider the predictions of this analysis in turn. In (36a), know is analyzed
as a question-taking predicate that relates an individual to the Dayal-answer of a
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question. Thus, this treatment derives the same interpretation for a sentence likeMax
knows which student smokes as the Dayal-style analysis does in (14) above. Thus, the
analysis preserves Dayal’s correct prediction that the UP/EP projects to the matrix
level.
On the other hand, be certain in (36b) predicts something different from the simple
extension of the Dayal-style analysis. According to (36b), x is certain (about) Q is
true iff for all worlds compatible with x’s beliefs, x believes that the Dayal-answer of
Q in that world is true. The following exemplifies the treatment of the embedding of
singular-which complement according to this analysis:
(37) Max is certain which student smokes  ∀v[v∈Doxmw → Doxmw ⊆ Ansv(Q)]
The interpretation given in (37) roughly states that Max believes that she has a correct
belief about which student smokes. Thismatches the intuitive interpretation of certain-
wh. In particular, it captures the obligatory strong exhaustivity of a question embedded
under be certain, as Uegaki (2015) points out.17
What is important for our purposes is the fact that the analysis captures the projection
pattern of the UP/EP with be certain. Assuming universal projection out of universal
quantification, (37) is defined only if ∀v[v ∈ Doxmw → Ansv(Q) is defined]. This
holds only if Max believes that exactly one student smokes. Crucially, here, the world
with respect to whichAns is evaluated is not the matrix evaluation world, but is bound
by the universal quantification over the subject’s belief worlds. This is made possible
in Uegaki (2015) by letting Ans be part of the lexical semantics of the embedding
predicate, rather than an independent operator that feeds a propositional argument to
the embedding predicate, as in Dayal (1996).
Despite this welcome feature, the approach faces problems. First of all, the pre-
supposition projection behavior of agree discussed in the previous section remains to
be a problem for Uegaki (2015) since it is not straightforward to define a plausible
lexical entry for agree along the lines of (36) that would derive the projection behav-
iors. Furthermore, as we will see in the next subsection, even if such a lexical entry
were possible, the analysis would face problems when it is extended to declarative
complements.
Uegaki’s (2015) analysis faces further problemswhenviewed as a part of the general
semantic theory of question-embedding, which would encompass a unified account of
the presuppositions of x VsQ and x Vs that p across different predicates V , as envi-
sioned in Sect. 1. This is so since extending the analysis to the declarative-embedding
caseswouldmake empirically incorrect predictions. To illustrate the problems, we first
have to make it explicit how Uegaki’s (2015) treatment of interrogative complements
embedded under know and be certain can be integrated with an analysis of declarative
complements.
17 This is so because (37) is true iff every Dayal-answer is either incompatible with Max’s beliefs, or
is entailed by it. See Theiler et al. (2018) for a similar treatment of be certain in terms of the notion of
introspection.
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2.5.1 Uniform semantics for complementation
Uegaki’s (2015) analysis is based on the uniform semantics for complementa-
tion, where declarative and interrogative complements share the same semantic type,
i.e., a set of propositions, which is selected by clause-embedding predicates such as
know and be certain.18 In particular, Uegaki (2015) analyzes declarative complements
as denoting the singleton set consisting of the proposition it traditionally denotes. For
instance, the declarative complement that Ash smokes is analyzed as follows, where
A is the proposition that Ash smokes.
(38) that Ash smokes  {A}
Given this, declarative-embedding under know is analyzed as follows:
(39) Max knows that Ash smokes  knoww(m,Answ({A}))
The interpretation in (39) presupposes that Ash smokes, and asserts that Max knows
that Ash smokes. Here, the presupposition of Ans boils down to the factivity presup-
position that Ash smokes.19 This is an empirically correct prediction.
2.5.2 Problem 1: be certain that
A problem arises when we consider declarative-embedding under be certain. The
following is the interpretation predicted by Uegaki (2015) for a sentence with be
certain and a declarative complement.
(40) Max is certain that Ash smokes  ∀v[v∈Doxmw → Doxmw ⊆ Ansv({A})]
Assuming a universal projection of presuppositions out of universal quantification
(just as in the case of (37) above), we have that (40) presupposes ∀v[v ∈ Doxmw →
Ansv({A}) is defined]. Since Ansv({A}) is defined only if A(v), this presupposition
amounts to ∀v[v ∈Doxmw → A(v)], i.e., Max believes that Ash smokes. Empirically,
this presupposition seems too strong for (40). Rather than presupposing Max’s belief
that Ash smokes, (40) seems to presupposes that it is merely compatible with Max’s
beliefs that Ash smokes.
One might attempt to remedy the situation by supposing that we have a non-
universal presupposition projection in (40). Note, however, that this move runs counter
to our objective, i.e., to analyze the presuppositions of certain-wh and certain-that in a
unifiedmanner, since the analysis of the projection of theUP/EP in certain-wh requires
18 Selectional restrictions of predicates like believe and wonder are analyzed as arising from the semantic
incompatibility between their lexical semantics and the particular complement type. See e.g., Ciardelli and
Roelofsen (2015); Uegaki (2015); Theiler et al. (2019); Uegaki and Sudo (2019).
19 Note that it is reasonable to assume that the predicateknow in the intermediate language also presupposes
the truth of the propositional argument. In such a case, the factivity is redundantly stated in (39), once by the
factivity of know and once byAns. See Uegaki (2015) for a formulation where the attitude predicate in the
intermediate language corresponding to know is non-veridical, and thus the factivity is solely contributed
by Ans.
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universal projection. The point here is that, as long as we are trying to achieve a uni-
fied analysis, once the presupposition of certain-wh is analyzed in terms of universal
projection, one is forced to analyze the presupposition of certain-that in terms of uni-
versal projection as well, thus predicting too strong of a presupposition. Of course,
one can analyze certain-wh in terms of the universal projection while claiming that we
have a non-universal projection in the case of certain-that. That would be empirically
adequate, but leave the question of why the projection behaviors are different between
the interrogative-embedding case and the declarative-embedding case.
2.5.3 Problem 2: agree that
The second problem concerns agree. As discussed in Sect. 2.2, the presupposition of
a which-question under agree projects both to the subject’s and to the with-argument’s
beliefs, as illustrated below:
(41) Does Max agree with Kim on which student smokes?
1.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that exactly one student smokes.’
2.
presup⇒ ‘Kim believes that exactly one student smokes.’
An analysis along the lines of Uegaki (2015) would capture this projection behavior
by defining a lexical entry for agree in terms of Ans that derives the following:
(42) x agrees with y on Q presupposes:
1. x believes that Answ(Q) is defined.
⇔ x believes that Q has a strongest true member.
2. y believes that Answ(Q) is defined.
⇔ y believes that Q has a strongest true member.
As briefly mentioned above, it is not straightforward to define a plausible lexical entry
for agree that derives these presuppositions. What is more crucial is that, regardless
of whether such a lexical entry can be defined, (42) would make incorrect predictions
about the presuppositions of the declarative-embedding under agree. This is so since
wewould have the following as the declarative-embedding case where Q is a singleton
set:
(43) x agrees with y that p presupposes:
1. x believes that {p} has a strongest true member. ⇔ x believes p.
2. y believes that {p} has a strongest true member. ⇔ y believes p.
This is an incorrect prediction, as an agree-that sentence does not presuppose that the
subject believes the complement, as can be seen in the following example:
(44) Does Max agree with Kim that Ash smokes?
presup⇒ ‘Kim believes that Ash smokes.’
presup
 ‘Max believes that Ash smokes.’
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Taking a step back, both with be certain and with agree, we have seen that the
UP projecting to the subject’s belief poses a problem for Uegaki (2015). The core
of the problem is the same across the two predicates. Even if the analysis correctly
predicts the projection behavior in the interrogative case, it incorrectly predicts that a
similar pattern would hold for the declarative case. This is by virtue of the fact that
the presupposition is encoded in the lexical semantics of the embedding predicate and
that declarative complements are treated as singleton proposition-sets.20
2.6 Diagnosing the problems
So far, I have considered three existing analyses concerning the UP/EP of wh-
complements, i.e., a simple extension of Dayal (1996), an extension of Dayal (1996)
based on Spector and Egré (2015) and one based on Uegaki (2015). I have argued that
none of them can fully capture the data with different embedding predicates. In this
section, I will state the problem in more general terms.
Abstractly, we can understand the difference between the simple extension of Dayal
(1996) and its extension based on Spector and Egré (2015) on the one hand and
Uegaki (2015) on the other as the difference in the locus of the presupposition carrier,
i.e., which lexical item is defined as a partial function. In Dayal (1996) and in its
extension following Spector and Egré (2015), the relevant presupposition is carried by
the Ans-operator. On the other hand, in Uegaki (2015), it is carried by the embedding
predicate (since the Ans-operator is part of the predicate’s lexical semantics). This
is schematically represented in (45), where the boxes mark the items that carry the
presupposition.
(45) x Vs Q 
(i) V (x, Answ (Q)) (simple extension of Dayal 1996)
(ii) ∃w′[V (x, Answ′ (Q))] (extension of Dayal 1996 based on S&E)
(iii) V (x, Q) (Uegaki 2015)
In (i), Ans is defined as a partial function that triggers the maximality presupposition.
The application of Ans to Q is defined if this presupposition is met with respect
to the matrix evaluation world and Q. Crucially, the proposition resulting from the
application does not carry the presupposition. This treatment incorrectly predicts that
20 It is in principle possible to define a lexical entry for the relevant predicates that avoids this issue, by
making the entry sensitive to the cardinality of the proposition-set in the first argument. For example, the
following lexical entry for be certain captures the presupposition projection behavior in the interrogative-
embedding case while avoiding the problematic prediction in the declarative-embedding case:
(i) be certain  λQ〈st,t〉λxe.
[ |Q| > 1 ∧ ∀v[v∈Doxwx → Doxxw ⊆ Ansv(Q)]∨|Q| = 1 ∧ Doxxw ⊆
⋃
Q
]
However, it is plausible to assume that there is a general constraint against a lexical entry that is sensitive
to the cardinality of the proposition-set. This is so, since allowing such lexical entries leads to the danger
of ruling in various empirically implausible lexical entries. One such lexical entry is *shknow discussed
by Spector and Egré (2015), which would mean ‘know’ with declarative complements and ‘wonder’ with
interrogative complements. See George (2011, Sect. 4.5.2), Theiler et al. (2018, Sect. 5) and Uegaki (2019,
Sect. 6) for related discussion.
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the presupposition projects to the matrix level regardless of the embedding predicate
V .
In (ii), the presupposition of Ans is not automatically projected to the matrix level
because of the existential quantification into the world in which it is evaluated. It is
projected to the matrix level in the case where V is a factive predicate like know, by
virtue of the factivity presupposition. However, this is not the case with non-veridical
predicates like be certain and agree. Although the lack of the matrix projection with
non-veridical predicates is a correct prediction, the account fails to predict that the
presupposition of Ans projects to the attitude holder’s beliefs. This is so because
Answ′(Q) itself does not carry the presupposition, in the sense that it is not a partial
function.
In (iii), the maximality presupposition is encoded in the lexical semantics of the
predicate in ways that vary across predicates, deriving lexically-specific projection
patterns. As such, this treatment overcomes the problem with the analysis in (i). Such
an analysis would be adequate if our goal is just to analyze the projection pattern
of the UP/EP in interrogative-embedding sentences, ignoring the presuppositions of
declarative-embedding counterparts. However, given that our goal is to find an account
that captures the presuppositions of both interrogative and declarative-embedding sen-
tences, the analysis in (iii) remains problematic. This is so because itmakes an incorrect
prediction with respect to declarative complements, given the uniform semantics for
complementation assumed in the analysis. Since the presupposition is encoded in
the predicate, the analysis incorrectly predicts that the presupposition shows up with
declarative complements as well, assuming that the same lexical entry is used for both
interrogative and declarative complementation. The prediction with respect to the
declarative complements is not a problem for the simple extension of Dayal (1996)
schematized in (i) and its extension based on S&E in (ii) since Ans appears only in
interrogative complements in these analyses.
At this point, another analytical possibility presents itself: The presupposition can
in principle be carried by the complement meaning.We can schematize this possibility
as follows:
(46) x Vs Q  V (x, f (Q) )
Here, f is a (possibly vacuous) operator such asAns that takes the question denotation
as an input and passes it to the predicate meaning.What is crucial in this schema is that
the semantic argument of the predicate corresponding to the interrogative complement
carries the presupposition. Note that this possibility is different from that in (45-i/ii),
since f (Q) as a whole in (46) carries the relevant presupposition while Ans(Q) in
(45-i/ii) doesn’t.
It is clear at this point that the analysis schematized in (46) does not run into the
same problem as the Uegaki-style analysis in (45-iii), i.e., the incorrect prediction with
declarative complements, since the presupposition would not be triggered in the case
of declarative complementation. The remaining questions are whether the analysis can
overcome the problem for the analyses in (45-i/ii), i.e., the variation in the projection
patterns across predicates, and whether it can correctly capture the projection of the
UP/EP to the attitude holder’s beliefs in the case of non-veridical predicates. In the
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next section, I will argue that the line of analysis in (46) provides a straightforward
account of the variation in the projection patterns, once we analyze the answers in the
question denotation as carrying the UP/EP.
3 Proposal: presuppositional answers
I propose that it is the answer proposition that carries the UP/EP of wh-complements,
rather than an operator that outputs an answer proposition (which itself is devoid of
the UP/EP) (as in Dayal 1996 and its possible extensions) or a question-embedding
predicate (Uegaki 2015). The gist of the proposal can be illustrated with the following
examples:
(47) a. Max knows who caught the unicorn.
presup⇒ ‘There is a unique unicorn.’
b. Max is certain who caught the unicorn.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that there is a unique unicorn.’
c. Max agrees with Kim on who caught the unicorn.
presup⇒ ‘Max and Kim believe that there is a unique unicorn.’
In (47), it is plausible to assume that each Hamblin answer of the embedded question
presupposes that there is a unique unicorn. Crucially, the projection pattern of the
presupposition in (47) is exactly the same as that of the UP/EP we observed in the
previous section: with know, it projects to the matrix level; with be certain, it projects
to the attitude holder’s belief; with agree, it projects both to the attitude holder’s and
to the with-argument’s beliefs. Thus, these examples indicate that, if the UP/EP is
treated as a presupposition of an answer, just like the definiteness presupposition for
the unicorn in (47), whatever analysis that accounts for the projection data in (47)
should also account for the projection patterns of the UP/EP.
In this section, Iwill present such an analysis, and show that it captures the projection
pattern of the UP/EP discussed in the previous section, once the UP/EP is treated as
coming from answers. The analysis consists of two parts: (i) an existential proposition-
oriented semantics for question-embedding along the lines of Spector and Egré (2015)
and (ii) the lexical-semantic encoding of the presupposition projection behaviors of the
embedding predicates, when they embed a presuppositional declarative complement,
as in the following examples:21
(48) a. Max knows that the unicorn danced.
presup⇒ ‘There is a unique unicorn & it danced (& Max believes that there is
a unique unicorn).’
b. Max is certain that the unicorn danced.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes there is a unique unicorn & it is compatible withMax’s
beliefs that it danced.’
21 The parenthesized belief presupposition with know intuitively seems weaker compared with cases with
the non-veridical predicates be certain and agree. I will discuss this in Sect. 3.2.
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c. Max agrees with Kim that the unicorn danced.
presup⇒ ‘Both Max and Kim believe that there is a unique unicorn & Kim
believes that it danced.’
An analysis of interrogative-embedding sentences based on these independently moti-
vated components (i-ii) captures the projection pattern of theUP/EP, oncewe adopt the
proposal that the UP/EP comes from an answer. The analysis also naturally captures
the presuppositional behavior of the predicates when they take declarative comple-
ments, as part of their lexical semantics. Thus, the analysis succeeds in capturing the
presuppositions of both declarative and interrogative-embedding sentences, unlike the
existing analyses considered in the previous section.
In the first two subsections below (Sect. 3.1–3.2), I will go over the two background
assumptions needed for the analysis: (i) an existential semantics for question-
embedding and (ii) the lexical-semantic encoding of the presupposition projection
behaviors of the embedding predicates. Based on these assumptions, in Sect. 3.3,
I show that my central proposal—that the answers carry the UP/EP—captures the
projection pattern of the UP/EP. In Sect. 3.4, I present a particular compositional
implementation of the wh-complement, which derives the UP/EP for each Hamblin
answer (cf. Hirsch and Schwarz 2019).
The analysis to be presented in this section employs a proposition-oriented seman-
tics. However, this is merely for expository purposes, and my proposal does not hinge
on this.As long asmy central proposal—that the answers carry theUP/EP—is adopted,
the account can be formulated using either a proposition-oriented semantics or a
question-oriented semantics. The formulation within a question-oriented semantics is
given inAppendix B. Furthermore, the particular compositional implementation of the
proposal to be discussed in Sect. 3.4 is not the only analytical option. In Appendix A, I
present another implementation of the proposal, in which theAns-operator ismodified
so that it returns a presuppositional answer as its output.
3.1 The existential semantics for question-embedding
The general compositional mechanism of question-embedding I will adopt is the exis-
tential semantics by Spector and Egré (2015). For concreteness, I will assume the
general lexical rule by S&E that converts a proposition-taking denotation Vdecl to a
question-taking denotation Vint , repeated from Sect. 2.4 above:
(49) The lexical rule generating question-embedding predicates
Vint = λQ〈st,t〉λxeλws : ∃w′[Vdecl(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(x)(w) is defined].
∃w′[Vdecl(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(x)(w) is defined∧Vdecl(Answ′(Q))(x)(w)]
I will adopt this formulation since it is shown by Spector and Egré (2015) to be
compatible with the detailed empirical considerations concerning aspects of the
question-embedding phenomena other than the UP/EP.22
22 It might seem that the lexical rule in (49) is too simplistic in view of the various levels of exhaustivity
involved in the readings of question-embedding sentences. Specifically, as it stands, the lexical rule only
123
The presupposition ofwh-complements
One might ask what the role of the Ans-operator in (49) is, under the current pro-
posal. If each answer in Q already carries the UP/EP, what function does Ans serve?
After all, wasn’tAns there to bring about the UP/EP?A short answer is thatAns under
the current proposal would primarily be a type-shifting device. As part of the general
semantics for question-embedding, we need away to relate proposition-oriented deno-
tations of embedding predicates with the proposition-set question denotations. Ans
offers a way to achieve this, as it converts a proposition-set into its specific member.
Unlike in Dayal (1996) and its possible extensions considered in the previous section,
however, the maximality presupposition of Ans is not responsible for the projection
of the UP/EP in sentences with wh-complements, as we will see below.
It should also be mentioned that my analysis does not rely on the presence of
exhaustification in the presupposition. That is, the derivations of concrete examples
presented below will go through regardless of the presence of Exh. In fact, as long as
the semantics of the question-embedding predicts an existentially quantified presup-
position (over the answers in the question denotation, or the worlds with respect to
which Ans is evaluated), the analysis makes the same predictions.
3.2 The presupposition projection properties of individual predicates
The next ingredient needed for the analysis is the presupposition projection properties
of individual embedding predicates. Since the semantics for question-embedding I
adopt is the Spector and Egré-style proposition-oriented semantics, these properties
can be encoded in the proposition-taking denotations of the relevant predicates.
The presupposition projection properties know, be certain and agree can be tested
by considering examples where these predicates embed a presuppositional declarative
complement, as in the following (I will discuss the nature of the belief presupposition
with know at the end of this subsection):
(50) a. Max knows that the unicorn danced.
b. Max doesn’t know that the unicorn danced.
c. Does Max know that the unicorn danced?
d. If Max knows that the unicorn danced, she will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘There is a unique unicorn & it danced & Max believes that there is a
unique unicorn.’
Footnote 22 continued
captures weak exhaustivity, but cannot capture strong exhaustivity or intermediate exhaustivity. In this
paper, I will abstract away from the issue of exhaustivity, as it is orthogonal to our central concern—the
projection pattern of the UP/EP. This simplification and the use of the lexical rule in (49) are warranted
since the projection of the UP/EP only concerns the presuppositional part of (49), and Spector and Egré
(2015) show that the presupposition of question-embedding sentences involves the one in (49), regardless
of the level of exhaustivity in the assertive part. Exceptions to this statement are cases where a question
is embedded by predicates that have downward-entailing presuppositions, such as realize and discover. In
these cases, Spector and Egré (2015) argue that the presupposition is stronger than what would be predicted
with exhaustification. Despite the difference, my analysis for other factive predicates (e.g., know) will
carry over to these cases as well, as the analysis does not hinge on the presence of exhaustification in the
presupposition.
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(51) a. Max is certain that the unicorn danced.
b. Max isn’t certain that the unicorn danced.
c. Is Max certain that the unicorn danced?
d. If Max is certain that the unicorn danced, she will let us know.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that there is a unique unicorn& it is compatible withMax’s
beliefs that it danced.’
(52) a. Max agrees with Kim that the unicorn danced.
b. Max doesn’t agree with Kim that the unicorn danced.
c. Does Max agree with Kim that the unicorn danced.
d. If Max agrees with Kim that the unicorn danced, she will let her know.
presup⇒ ‘BothMax and Kim believe that there is a unique unicorn &Kim believes
that it danced.’
Schematically, we can write the presupposition-projection properties of the
predicates observed in (50)–(52) as follows, where the operator π retrieves the pre-
supposition from a proposition, as defined in (53).
(53) π(p) := λw.[p(w) = 1 ∨ p(w) = 0]
(54) For all x , y, w and p, (where x and y are presupposition-free)
a. knoww(x, p) is defined iff Doxxw ⊆ π(p) ∧ p(w)
b. certainw(x, p) is defined iff Doxxw ⊆ π(p)∧∃w′[w′ ∈ Doxxw∧p(w′)]
c. agreew(x, y, p) is defined iff Dox
x
w ⊆ π(p) ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ Doxyw →
p(w′)]
From a theoretical perspective, the presupposition-projection properties in (54) can
be understood as the combination of (a) the projection of the presupposition of the
complement and (b) the presuppositions triggered by the predicates themselves. The
former is constant across know, be certain and agree, and arguably universal across
all attitude predicates: x Vs p presupposes that x believes π(p) (Karttunen 1973,
1974; Heim 1992). This is stated below.23
(55) For any attitude predicate V and for all x , w and p,
Vw(x, p) is defined iff Doxxw ⊆ π(p) (Karttunen 1974)
23 Verbs of belief and conjecture (e.g., believe, think, expect, intend, suspect, assume), preferen-
tial/desiderative predicates (e.g., hope, fear, want, wish, be glad), as well as dubitative predicates (e.g.,
doubt) conform to this generalization (Karttunen 1973; Heim 1992). It doesn’t apply to some communica-
tion predicates, such as tell, say, and lie, as exemplified below:
(i) Max has {told me/said/lied} that the unicorn danced.
??
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that there is a unique unicorn.’
The pattern seems to be that the presupposition projection behavior in (55) is not observed for a subset
of communication predicates that can be interpreted as describing an act of communication without the
subject’s commitment. Although agree may be considered as a communication predicate, my sense is that
it can’t describe the type of commitment-less communication that tell, say and lie can. This makes agree a
predicate that is subject to the generalization in (55).
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The latter is a lexically-dependent presupposition triggered by the embedding
predicates (already touched on in Sect. 2.4). Specifically, know has the factivity pre-
supposition that the complement is true; be certain has the presupposition that the
complement is compatible with the subject’s beliefs; x agrees with y that p presup-
poses that y believes p. These presuppositions are formally represented as follows:
(56) for all x , w, and presupposition-free p,
a. knoww(x, p) is defined iff p(w)
b. certainw(x, p) is defined iff ∃w′[w′ ∈ Doxxw ∧ p(w′)]
c. agreew(x, y, p) is defined iff ∀w′[w′ ∈ Doxyw → p(w′)]
The presuppositions schematized in (54) can be derived from the lexically-specific
presuppositions in (56) and the general presupposition projection pattern in (55).
Before concluding this subsection, I would like to make a remark on the nature
of the belief presupposition with know. In (50), the presupposition that Max believes
that there is a unique unicorn seems relatively weak, compared to the status of the
same belief presupposition in the case of be certain and agree. For example, (50b)
may be judged true even if Max doesn’t believe in the existence of a unicorn, as long
as the other presuppositions are satisfied. This is not prima facie expected under the
generalization stated in (55) that all attitude predicates have the belief presupposition.
One possible explanation for why the belief presupposition is felt weak in the
case of know (and other veridical predicates), compared to non-veridical predicates,
stems from the pragmatics of sentence verification, especially that of truth-value-less
sentences. As von Fintel (2004) and Abrusán and Szendrői (2013) show, speakers may
judge a sentence as true or false even if it is semantically a presupposition failure when
the sentence entails a piece of information serving as a ‘foothold’ for verification. To
see this, consider the following pair of sentences:
(57) a. The king of France isn’t bold.
b. The king of France hasn’t visited Australia.
Both of these sentences are semantically presupposition failures. However, (57a)
sounds odd to most English speakers whereas (57b) tends to be felt true (Abrusán
and Szendrői 2013). One way to account for the contrast is to say that, in (57b), the
object DP Australia denotes an entity that serves as a foothold for verification. That
is, when speakers try to verify (57b), they base the judgment on Australia, an existing
entity in the actual world, and determines the sentence’s truth value depending on
whether the set of its visitors include the king of France or not. Since the visitors of
Australia do not include the king of France, (57b) is felt as true. On the other hand,
(57a) does not mention any existing entity that can serve as the foothold for sentence
verification in a similar manner.
Something similar can be said about our (50), as well as the following kind of
examples:
123
W. Uegaki
(58) a. Max knows that the elevator in the South Building is out of service.
b. Max doesn’t know that the elevator in the South Building is out of service.
presup⇒ (i) there is exactly one elevator in the South Building; and (ii) Max
believes that there is exactly one elevator in the South Building.
(59) a. Max knows that Kim stopped smoking.
b. Max doesn’t know that Kim stopped smoking.
presup⇒ (i) Kim used to smoke; and (ii) Max believes that Kim used to smoke.
These sentences have two presuppositions: the presupposition of the complement and
the presupposition that Max—the attitude holder—believes the presupposition of the
complement. In the context where the first presupposition ismet but the second presup-
position is violated, the sentences are presupposition failures, semantically speaking.
However, it is plausible that the first presupposition serves as the foothold for ver-
ification in the following way. The presupposition of the complement represents a
preliminary fact that an attitude holder must know in order for them to be consid-
ered as knowing the information represented by the complement. If they don’t know
this preliminary fact, positive knowledge sentences, such as (50a), (58a), (59a), are
rejected as false. Conversely, their negative counterparts, such as (50b), (58b), (59b),
are judged as true. Henceforth, I will assume this pragmatic explanation for the weak-
ness of the belief presupposition with veridical predicates. This explanation carries
over to the projection behavior of the UP/EP in interrogative-embedding sentences,
as we will see below.
3.3 UP/EP in each answer
Now that we have established the two background assumptions, i.e., the existential
semantics for question-embedding and the presupposition-projection properties of the
individual embedding predicates, we are in a position to illustrate the analysis of the
projection of theUP/EP. In this section, Iwill present an implementation of the proposal
where the UP/EP is encoded in each answer of the question denotation. To motivate
the analysis, we start by observing the projection behavior of non-UP/EP presuppo-
sitions triggered within an interrogative complement, mentioned in the beginning of
the section.
3.3.1 Presupposition triggers within an interrogative complement
Consider example (60), a wh-clause involving a singular definite DP inside it:
(60) who caught the unicorn
Here, it is reasonable to think that each answer in the Hamblin-denotation of this
clause carries a presupposition about the unique existence of a unicorn. That is, the
Hamblin-denotation of (60) would look like the following:
(61) { λw′ : ∃!x[unicornw′(x)]. caughtw′(y, ιx[unicornw′(x)]) | y ∈ De }
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As suggested in the beginning of this section, what is crucial for us is that the projection
of this presupposition under various embedding predicates, shown in (62), patterns
exactly like the projection of the UP of singular-which questions, shown in (63):
(62) a. Max knows who caught the unicorn.
presup⇒ ‘There is a unique unicorn.’
b. Max is certain (about) who caught the unicorn.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that there is a unique unicorn.’
c. Max agrees with Kim on who caught the unicorn.
presup⇒ ‘Max and Kim believe that there is a unique unicorn.’
(63) a. Max knows which student smokes.
presup⇒ ‘Exactly one student smokes.’
b. Max is certain (about) which student smokes.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that exactly one student smokes.’
c. Max agrees with Kim on which student smokes.
presup⇒ ‘Max and Kim believe that exactly one student smokes.’
The parallel in projection patterns in (62) and (63) is straightforwardly explained if
the latter is encoded in each proposition in the Hamblin denotation, just as in (61). A
Hamblin denotation for which student smokes according to this proposal would look
like (64), where each proposition in the set carries the proposition that exactly one
student smokes.24
(64) which student smokes 
{ λw′ : ∃!x[studentw′(x) ∧ smokew′(x)]. studentw′(y)∧smokew′(y) | y ∈ De }
In otherwords, as long as the presupposition is triggered by each answer in theHam-
blin denotation, the general semantics for question-embedding presented in Sect. 3.1
and the presupposition projection properties of each predicates presented in Sect. 3.2
account for the projection patterns of the UP/EP in (63). Below, I will illustrate this in
the case of the three predicates, know, be certain and agree.
3.3.2 Application of the analysis to particular predicates
As stated above, my analysis takes two things as given: the existential semantics for
question-embedding along the lines of Spector andEgré (2015) and the presupposition-
projection properties of the proposition-oriented denotations of individual predicates.
These two assumptions are repeated below for easier reference.
24 Two notes about the formula in (64). First, for the sake of simplicity, I use ∃! to indicate uniqueness
here, but this is of course not intended as a general format of the logical translation of the UP/EP for
wh-complements. My eventual compositional treatment of wh-complements makes use of the maximality
presupposition, following Dayal (1996). This would derive the UP that is equivalent to (64) in the case of
singular-which complements and an EP in the case of plural-which and simplex wh-complements. Second,
I exemplify the analysis here with the de dicto reading of the NP-part of the which-phrase. In Sect. 3.4
below, I discuss how the corresponding de re reading can be derived, following Rullmann and Beck (1998).
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(49) The lexical rule generating question-embedding predicates
Vint = λQ〈st,t〉λxeλws : ∃w′[Vdecl(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(x)(w) is defined].
∃w′[Vdecl(ExhQ(Answ′(Q)))(x)(w) is defined ∧ Vdecl(Answ′(Q))(x)(w)]
(54) For all x , w and p,
a. knoww(x, p) is defined iff Doxxw ⊆ π(p) ∧ p(w)
b. certainw(x, p) is defined iff Doxxw ⊆ π(p) ∧ ∃w′[w′ ∈ Doxxw ∧ p(w′)]
c. agreew(x, y, p) is defined iff Dox
x
w ⊆ π(p) ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ Doxyw →
p(w′)]
Also, in the illustrations to follow, I will repeatedly use the following logical fact:
(65) Let Q be a set of propositions such that there is a proposition p that each
member of Q presupposes p and nothing else. Then, for all worldsw such that
Answ(Q) is defined, ExhQ(Answ(Q)) presupposes p and nothing else (i.e.,
for all worlds w′, ExhQ(Answ(Q))(w′) is defined iff p(w′)).
More concretely, this means that, if a presupposition (e.g., the uniqueness for (62)
or the UP/EP for (63)) is encoded in each proposition in Q, ExhQ(Answ(Q)) also
presupposes the same presupposition for allw that makesAnsw(Q) defined. It is easy
to see why this is the case, as Ans is defined to pick out a certain member of Q and
ExhQ(Answ(Q)) has the same presupposition as Answ(Q).
Know The matrix projection of the UP with know can be derived as in (67), where I
use the shorthands in (66):
(66) a. which student smokes  Q
b. up := λw.∃!x[studentw(x) ∧ smokew(x)]
(67) Max knows which student smokes.
presup⇒
∃w′[knoww(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(m) is defined] [by (49)]
i. ⇔ ∃w′[Answ′ (Q) is defined
︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. ofAns
∧ Doxmw ⊆ π(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))) ∧ ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
by (54a)
]
ii. ⇔ ∃w′[Doxmw ⊆ π(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))) ∧ ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w)]
[the presup. ofAns is entailed by presup. contributed by (54a)]
iii. ⇔ ∃w′[Doxmw ⊆ up ∧ ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w)] [by Fact (65)]
iv. ⇔ Doxmw ⊆ up ∧ ∃w′[ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w)]
The derivation can be roughly paraphrased as follows. First of all, the sentence has the
presupposition predicted by the lexical rule in (49). This can be rewritten as in line (i)
given the projection of the presupposition of Ans itself and that of the know-that sen-
tence in (54a). Line (i) can be paraphrased as ‘there is a definedDayal-answer of Q such
that its presupposition is believed by Max and it is true’. Since ‘Answ′(Q) is defined’
(i.e., ‘the Dayal-answer is defined’) is entailed by ‘ExhQ(Answ′(Q))(w)’ (i.e., ‘the
exhaustification of the Dayal-answer is true’), the former conjunct can be dropped as
in line (ii). By Fact (65), this can be rewritten as in line (iii), i.e., ‘Max believes up
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and there is a Dayal-answer of Q that is true’. Finally, since the variable w′ does not
appear in the first conjunct of (iii), it is equivalent to (iv).
Now, it can be proved that the second conjunct of (iv) is equivalent to up:
(68) ∃w′[ExhQ(Answ′(Q))(w)] ⇔ up(w)
This is so because of the following reasoning: the left-hand side of (68) states that the
exhaustification of some Dayal-answer is true in w. Since this Dayal-answer presup-
poses up by assumption, this is the case only if up is true in w. Conversely, if up is
true inw, the left-hand side is true because one can always find a Dayal-answer whose
exhaustification is true in w (namely the exhaustification of the Dayal-answer in w
itself).25
All in all, the predicted presupposition of (67) can be paraphrased as follows:
(69) ‘Max believes that exactly one student smokes, and in fact exactly one student
smokes.’
The second conjunct amounts to the UP projected to the matrix level, which we have
observed in the previous section. On the other hand, the belief presupposition in the
first conjunct has not beenmentioned in connection to the UP/EP projection with know
up to this point. In fact, native speakers report that the belief presupposition seems
quite weak with know, compared with be certain.
(70) John doesn’t know which student smokes.
??
presup⇒ ‘John believes that exactly one student smokes.’
I suggest that the explanation in terms of the pragmatics of sentence verification
made for the declarative counterparts in Sect. 3.2 carries over to this case. That is,
the matrix UP of (67), (70) serves as a foothold for sentence verification. To see this,
consider a context in which it is known that exactly one student smokes, but Max
does not believe that there is a unique student smoker. In this context, the semantic
analysis predicts (67), (70) to be presupposition failures, as the context violates the
belief presupposition. However, once it is established that there is actually a unique
student smoker, (67) can be rejected as false sinceMax does not know this preliminary
fact. Conversely, (70)—the negation of (67)—can be judged true.
Be certainWe can derive the projection of the UP with be certain in a similar fashion.
(71) Max is certain (about) which student smokes.
presup⇒
∃w′[certainw(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(m) is defined] [by (49)]
i. ⇔ ∃w′[Answ′ (Q) is defined
︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. ofAns
∧ Doxmw ⊆ π(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))) ∧ ∃w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxmw ∧ ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w′′)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
by (54b)
]
25 Note that this reasoning holds regardless of the presence of the Exh-operator in the left-hand side. Since
Exh makes the left-hand side stronger, we only have to prove that the left-hand side without Exh entails
the right-hand side. The left-hand side without Exh holds iff some Dayal-answer is true in w. Since all
Dayal-answers carry up by assumption, up is true in w.
123
W. Uegaki
ii. ⇔ ∃w′[Doxmw ⊆ π(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))) ∧ ∃w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxmw ∧ ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w′′)]]
[the presup. ofAns is entailed by the presup. contributed by (54b)]
iii. ⇔ ∃w′[Doxmw ⊆ up ∧ ∃w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxmw ∧ ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w′′)]] [by Fact (65)]
iv. ⇔ Doxmw ⊆ up ∧ ∃w′[∃w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxmw ∧ ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w′′)]]
v. ⇔ Doxmw ⊆ up [the 1st conj. of (iv) entails the 2nd conj.] 26
Paraphrasing, (i) says that there is a definedDayal-answer ofQ the presupposition of
whose exhaustification is believed by Max and whose exhaustification is compatible
with Max’s beliefs. After dropping the first conjunct as it is entailed by the other
conjuncts as in (ii), we can use Fact (65) to rewrite (ii) as in (iii), i.e., Max believes up
and there is a Dayal-answer whose exhaustification is compatible with Max’s beliefs.
Since the latter conjunct is entailed by the first conjunct (see fn. 26 for a proof), we
end up with the following presupposition predicted for (71).
(72) ‘Max believes that exactly one student smokes.’
This is exactly what we observed earlier, i.e., the projection to the subject’s beliefs.
Agree Finally, here is the derivation in the case of agree:
(73) Max agrees with Kim on which student smokes.
presup⇒
∃w′[agreew(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(k)(m) is defined] [by (49)]
i. ⇔ ∃w′[Answ′ (Q) is defined
︸ ︷︷ ︸
presup. ofAns
∧
Doxmw ⊆ π(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))) ∧ ∀w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxkw → ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w′′)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
by (54c)
]
ii. ⇔ ∃w′[Doxmw ⊆ π(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))∧∀w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxkw → ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w′′)]]
[presup. ofAns is entailed by the presup. contributed by (54c)]
iii. ⇔ ∃w′[Doxmw ⊆ up ∧ ∀w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxkw → ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w′′)]] [by Fact (65)]
iv. ⇔ Doxmw ⊆ up ∧ ∃w′[∀w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxkw → ExhQ(Answ′ (Q))(w′′)]]
Again paraphrasing, (i) says that there is a defined Dayal-answer of Q such that
the presupposition of its exhaustification is believed by Max and its exhaustification
is believed by Kim. After dropping the first conjunct and using Fact (65), it can be
rewritten as in (iii), i.e., Max believes up and there is a Dayal-answer of Q whose
exhaustification is believed by Kim. We end up with the following presupposition
predicted for (73):
(74) ‘Max believes that exactly one student smokes & there is an answer of Q such
that Kim believes that its exhaustification is true.’
Not only does this capture the projection of the UP both to the subject’s and to the
with-argument’s beliefs, but it also accounts for the asymmetry in strength between the
26 This entailment holds for the following reason. If Doxmw ⊆ up, there is a world in Doxmw where only
a specific student smokes. Let this world be w∗. Then w∗ ∈ Doxmw ∧ ExhQ(Answ∗(Q))(w∗). Thus, the
second conjunct holds. This reasoning holds even if we drop Exh because the second conjunct of (iv) would
be weaker without Exh.
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subject’s presupposed belief and the with-argument’s presupposed belief, discussed
earlier in footnote 12.27
Summing up, once we assume that each answer in the question denotation carries
theUP/EP, its projection patternswith know, be certain and agree can be accounted for,
given independently motivated presupposition projection behaviors of the predicates
as well as the existential semantics for question-embedding.
3.4 Internal composition ofwh-complements
Wenowmove on to the internal composition ofwh-complements, i.e., how to composi-
tionally derive the denotation of the complements where the answers carry the UP/EP.
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to this. One is to posit an additional opera-
tor that adds the Dayal-style maximality presupposition to the answers in the Hamblin
denotation. The other is to treat which-NPs as a kind of definite description and derive
a set of partial propositions through presupposition projection. The former approach
is considered in Uegaki (2018). The latter approach has been adopted by Rullmann
and Beck (1998) and Champollion et al. (2017) in their treatment of a presupposition
associated with which-questions (to be detailed immediately below), and has been
recently applied to the Dayal-style maximality presupposition by Hirsch and Schwarz
(2019).
As stated in the introduction, my goal in this paper is to investigate the projection
patterns of the UP/EP in the context of the general theory of question-embedding.
Thus, the issue concerning the internal semantic composition of wh-complements is
of secondary nature, as long as the composition guarantees that the individual answers
in the question denotation carry theUP/EP. For this reason, Iwill keepmydiscussion of
the internal composition of wh-complements minimal, and sketch a simple analysis in
the latter approach mentioned above, i.e., deriving a set of partial propositions through
the projection of presupposition from a definite-like semantics for which-NPs.
The analysis follows the insights of Rullmann and Beck (1998), who roughly treat
the semantics of which-complements as follows:
(75) which student smokes
 {‘the student a smokes’, ‘the student b smokes’, ‘the student c smokes’,...}
R&B compositionally derive this using a definite-like semantics for which-NPs. As
a result of the definiteness, each answer in (75) presupposes existence of a student.
Note that the UP/EP we are after is stronger than the presupposition captured in (75).
Rather than ‘there is a student’, we want each answer of the complement denotation
to presuppose that there is a unique student smoker. To achieve this, I roughly treat the
denotation of a wh-complement as follows, i.e., a set of propositions each identifying
an individual with the student smoker.
27 We predict the same presupposition even if Exh is dropped from the second conjunct of (73iv). This
is so because ∃w′[∀w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxkw → Answ′ (Q)(w′′)] holds only if ∀w′′[w′′ ∈ Doxkw → up(w′′)]
because Answ′ (Q) presupposes up for any w′ by assumption. Given that Kim believes up, if Kim believes
a Dayal-answer, she believes its exhaustification.
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(76) which student smokes  {a is the student who smokes, b is the student who
smokes, c is the student who smokes,...}
Formally, this is derived by assuming an LF that looks like the following:
(77)
2 CP
which
1 C’
C[+wh] p2
which1 student smokes
This structure follows the LF-based rendition of Karttunen’s (1977) analysis of ques-
tions by Heim (2016) and Dayal (2016), together with the additional assumption
that the lower copy of which is realized in the LF as the operator which, defined
shortly below.28 Furthermore, following Beck and Rullmann (1999), the NP-part of
a which-phrase is left downstairs to allow both the de re and de dicto readings via
world-indexing on the NP. (See Hirsch and Schwarz 2019 for an analysis along the
same lines.)
The translations of lexical items in (77) are given below, with the definition of the
operator the in (79), akin to Link’s (1983) σ -operator.
(78) a. which  λP〈e,t〉.∃x[P(x)]
b. C[+wh]  λp〈s,t〉[λq〈s,t〉.p = q]
c. whichi  λP〈e,t〉λQ〈e,t〉. i = the(λx .P(x) ∧ Q(x))
(79) the := λP〈e,t〉 : ∃x[P(x) ∧ ∀y[P(y) → y ≤ x]]. ιx[P(x)∧∀y[P(y) → y ≤
x]]
Hence, the structure in (77) is translated as in (80), and each answer of the question
(80) represents has the presupposition in (81) projected from the.
(80) (77)  λp.∃z[p = λw.[z = the(λx . studentw(x) ∧ smokew(x))]]
(81) ∃x[studentw(x) ∧ smokew(x) ∧ ∀y[studentw(y) ∧ smokew(y) → y ≤ x]]
Since student only ranges over singular individuals, (81) effectively states that there
is only one student smoker. Overall, this correctly derives the UP/EP as the presuppo-
sition of each answer. Note that this would not be possible under Rullmann and Beck’s
(1998) original analysis, since it is designed to only predict existential presupposition
with respect to the extension of the NP in which-NPs.
28 In order for which to take scope over the materials in the TP, it has to be assumed that a wh-phrase
internally merges to a projection below CP before internally merging to the specifier of CP.
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The analysis sketched above concerns which-complements, and its prediction with
respect to complements involving a simplex wh-phrase (e.g., who smokes) depends on
the definition of the wh-operator, who, in the lower copy position. Following Dayal’s
(1996) insight, the fact that simplex wh-complements only presuppose existence (and
not uniqueness) is captured by treating who as number-neutral, as follows:
(82) whoi  λP〈e,t〉. i = the(λx .human∗w(x) ∧ P(x))
3.5 Section summary
In this section, I have shown that the projection pattern of the UP/EP observed in
Sect. 2 can be properly captured, once we assume that the answers to the embed-
ded question carry the UP/EP. In addition to this central proposal, my analysis is
based on two independently motivated assumptions: the existential semantics for
question-embedding by Spector and Egré (2015) and the presupposition projection
properties of the proposition-taking denotations of individual embedding predicates.
It should also be emphasized that the analysis successfully accounts for the presup-
positions of sentences involving declarative complements—something that Uegaki
(2015) fails to capture—thanks to the presupposition-projection properties encoded
in the proposition-taking denotations of the embedding predicates. I have also pro-
vided a compositional implementation of the central proposal, based on a definite-like
semantics for the wh-item.
4 Matrix questions and rogative predicates
I have demonstrated that, once we assume that the UP/EP comes from the answers, we
can correctly capture the projection patterns of the UP/EP in sentences involving wh-
complements embeddedunder predicates such as know,be certain andagree.However,
as I will discuss in detail below, the account so far does not readily explain the presence
of the UP/EP in matrix questions as in (83), or the projection from under rogative
predicates (those predicates that embed only interrogative complements; Lahiri 2002)
as in (84).
(83) Which student smokes?
presup⇒ ‘Exactly one student smokes.’
(84) a. Max wonders which student smokes.
b. Max investigated which student smokes.
c. Max is curious which student smokes.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that exactly one student smokes.’
In this section, I discuss how the current analysis can capture the data as of (83)–(84)
with the help of additional assumptions.
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4.1 UP/EP of matrix questions
Matrix questions, as exemplified in (85) below, seem to carry the UP/EP. (In examples
involvingmatrix questions, I will hereafter indicate the UP/EP-like inferences with the
symbol
presup⇒ , but I will refine this empirical description later and actually argue that it is
an inference based on the speaker’s expectation, rather than a semantic presupposition.)
(85) a. Which student smokes?
presup⇒ ‘Exactly one student smokes.’
b. Which students smoke?
presup⇒ ‘Some student smokes.’
c. Who smokes?
presup⇒ ‘Someone smokes.’
This fact cannot be immediately accounted for in the current proposal, where UP/EP
comes from the answers. The reason for this is that the analysis only states that the
answers carry the relevant presuppositions, and does not state that the question having
such answers do.
Under the current proposal, the UP/EP-like inferences of matrix questions can be
captured by assuming that information-seeking matrix questions in general come with
the speaker’s expectation that at least one of their possible answers is defined. This
can be stated as a pragmatic principle, following Guerzoni’s (2003) Question Bridge
Principle, as follows:29
(86) Ask only those questions that you believe have a defined answer
An information-seeking question can be felicitously uttered only if the speaker
believes that it can be felicitously answered, i.e., if at least one of its answers
is defined. (cf. Guerzoni 2003, 41)
Given the UP/EP encoded in each possible answer of a matrix wh-question, the
principle in (86) is satisfied only if the speaker of such a question believes that the
UP/EP is met. Hence, the data in (85) is captured as the combination of two factors:
the answer-level UP/EP and the question-level speaker expectation in (86).
The account presented here can be illustrated using a matrix question involving a
presupposition trigger within the clause, as follows:
(87) Who caught the unicorn?
presup⇒ ‘There is a unique unicorn.’
We cannot capture the inference in (87) that there is a unique unicorn by the pre-
supposition triggered by the definite DP the unicorn alone. This is so because, it is
the possible answers to this question that carry the presupposition triggered by the
definite, and we need a further mechanism to account for the fact that the question
itself seems to imply that there is a unique unicorn. The pragmatic principle in (86)
provides such a mechanism, and exactly the same explanation applies to the matrix
effect of the UP/EP.
29 Guerzoni’s (2003) Question Bridge Principle is different from (86) in that it is stated as a condition
on the common ground, rather than on the speaker’s belief. The formulation of (86) as a condition on the
speaker’s belief is crucial in view of the ease of inter-speaker cancellation of the existential/uniqueness
inference of matrix questions, as will be argued below.
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Theaccount of thematrixEP/UP-like effect presented above is similar to the account
of a matrix-level presupposition of which-questions discussed by Rullmann and Beck
(1998, 226). According to R&B, the existential presupposition carried by each answer
of a which-question projects to the matrix level due to the question-level presupposi-
tion, which requires that there be a true answer to a question. One crucial difference
between R&B’s and my analysis (other than the content of the presupposition carried
by each answer, discussed in Sect. 3.4 above) is the nature of the question-level pre-
supposition. R&B treat the question-level presupposition as a semantic definedness
condition. On the other hand, the principle above treats the question-level ‘presuppo-
sition’ as a pragmatic phenomenon. Consequently, the two accounts differ in whether
the common ground or the speaker belief is required to entail the existence of a true
answer (cf. also Guerzoni 2003).
I argue that the latter view—thepragmatic viewbasedon the speaker’s expectation—
is empirically more plausible, in light of the following kind of contrast between the
inter-speaker and intra-speaker denial of the existence of a true answer, pointed out
in Dayal (2016, 51) (cf. Karttunen and Peters 1976, 355):
(88) A: Which student does Mary like?
B: No one.
(89) #I’m not sure whether Mary likes any student. Which student does she like?
As (88) shows, an interlocutor other than the questioner can overtly deny the existence
of a true answer in the question denotation. In contrast, as shown in (89), it is odd for the
questioner themself to overtly acknowledge the possibility that the question denotation
does not contain a true answer.30 This contrast is expected under the pragmatic view
based on the speaker’s expectation while it is hard to capture under the semantic
presupposition view, as far as I can see.
It is also worth noting that a pragmatic principle similar to (86) is assumed by
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984, 30–37) to account for what they call the existential
‘suggestion’ of matrix questions. However, their account is crucially different from
mine in lacking the answer-level UP/EP. This has led to two empirical shortcomings in
Groenendijk and Stokhof’s treatment of the presuppositions of questions. First, since
the UP/EP is treated entirely as a pragmatic phenomenon, it is not straightforward
how to account for the projection patterns of UP/EP from under different embedding
30 It is possible for the questioner to suspend the existence expectation using if any, as follows:
(i) Which student, if any, does Mary like?
I argue that this construction involves a conditional question, as follows:
(ii) If Mary likes any student, which student does she like?
Following Isaacs and Rawlins (2008), I assume that conditional questions involve temporary contextual
update.With respect to a temporary context inwhichMary indeed likes some student, the speaker expectation
that the question in the consequent contains a true answer is satisfied. Thus, (ii) does not involve any
inconsistency in the speaker’s expectations. On the other hand, (89) above involves a genuine inconsistency.
For, the first sentence states that the speaker considers it possible that Mary likes no student whereas the
question in the second sentence invokes the speaker expectation (in the actual, non-temporary, context) that
Mary likes some student.
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predicates. Second, the existential suggestion alone cannot account for the contrast
between the UP triggered by singular-which questions and the EP triggered by plural-
which and simplex-wh questions.
4.2 Projection from under rogative predicates
Another issue left open by the analysis presented in Sect. 3 is the treatment of cases
involving rogative predicates, as exemplified in the following:
(90) Max wonders which student smokes.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that exactly one student smokes.’
To account for this data within the current proposal, we have to state how the UP/EP
carried by the answers of the embedded question is projected by the rogative predicate
wonder. The analysis laid out in Sect. 3 does not automatically extend to rogative
predicates. Here is why: the analysis in Sect. 3 employs the existential semantics for
question-embedding by Spector andEgré (2015), which states themeaning of xVsQ
in terms of the proposition-taking denotation of the predicate V . This strategy does
not extend to rogative predicates since rogative predicates do not straightforwardly
have proposition-taking denotations.31
However, this simply means that the existential semantics for question-embedding
employed in Sect. 3 cannot be used to analyze the presupposition-projection behavior
of rogative predicates, and does not mean that the data in (90) is incompatible with the
current central proposal. In fact, making a plausible assumption about the definedness
condition of the question-taking denotation of rogative predicates enables us to account
for their projection behavior, seen in (90). Furthermore, we will see that the structure
of the additional assumption mirrors that of the pragmatic principle assumed in the
account of the matrix effect above.
Under the current proposal, where each answer in the question denotation carries the
UP/EP, the projection of the UP/EP in sentences involving wonder can be accounted
for by assuming the following presupposition for x wonders Q:
(91) Wondering presupposes believing the quest. has a defined answer
For all Q ∈ D〈st,t〉, x ∈ De and w ∈ Ds ,
wonderw(x, Q) is defined only if ∀w′ ∈ Doxxw[∃p ∈ Q[p(w′) is defined]]
When each proposition in Q carries the UP/EP, this presupposition is satisfied only if
the attitude holder x believes the UP/EP. As one can easily see, the structure of this
presupposition mirrors the pragmatic principle in (86) above. Above, we required that
the questioner believe that the question has a defined answer. Here, we require that
the wonderer believe that the question has a defined answer.
31 There are attempts to analyze rogative predicates using proposition-taking semantics. For example,
following suggestions in Karttunen (1977) and Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) among others, Uegaki (2015)
proposes a proposition-taking semantics forwonder, where it is decomposed into ‘want to know’. However,
it is unclear if such a decompositional strategy is available for rogative predicates in general, including e.g.,
be curious, investigate and ask.
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Just as in the case of the matrix effect discussed in the previous subsection, the
analysis can be illustrated using an interrogative complement that involves a presup-
position trigger inside the complement, such as the following:
(92) Max wonders who saw the unicorn.
presup⇒ ‘Max believes that there is a unique unicorn.’
Each possible answer of the interrogative complement in this example carries the
presupposition that there is a unique unicorn. The condition in (91) predicts that this
presupposition is projected by wonder to the attitude holder’s belief state, which is
exactly the pattern we see in (92).
I argue that the condition along the lines of (91) is general to rogative predicates,
such as investigate, be curious and inquire. This predicts the projection behavior
concerning the UP/EP similar to the case of wonder for these rogative predicates. I
submit that this is an empirically correct prediction.
4.3 Section summary
In this section, I have investigated how my central proposal that the UP/EP comes
from the answers can be extended to the behavior of the UP/EP in matrix questions
and sentences involving rogative predicates. Although the account presented in Sect. 3
cannot directly account for the data, it can do so by assuming plausible assumptions
about the pragmatics of (information-seeking) matrix questions and the semantics of
rogative predicates.
5 Conclusions and open issues
In this paper, I have pointed out that the projection pattern of the uniqueness/existential
presupposition (UP/EP) ofwh-questions under various question-embedding predicates
poses problems for existing accounts of the UP/EP. Specifically, simply extending
Dayal’s (1996) account based on the Ans-operator to question-embedding predicates
in general incorrectly predicts that the UP/EP projects to the matrix level even with
non-veridical predicates. Extending Dayal’s (1996) account based on Spector and
Egré’s (2015) analysis of non-veridical predicates avoids the incorrect prediction that
theUP/EPprojects to thematrix levelwith non-veridical predicates.However, it fails to
capture the fact that the presupposition projects to the attitude holder’s beliefs.Uegaki’s
(2015) analysis, which encodes the relevant presupposition to the embedders, correctly
captures the behavior of non-veridical predicates. Nevertheless, it makes incorrect
predictions about the cases when the predicates embed declarative complements.
I have proposed a solution to the problems based on the idea that theUP/EP is carried
by the answers in the question denotation. Once the UP/EP is encoded in the answers,
the relevant projection behaviors are naturally accounted for, given two independently
motivated mechanisms, i.e., existential semantics of question-embedding following
Spector and Egré (2015) and the presupposition-projection behavior of individual
predicates with respect to declarative complements.
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Taking a step back, the current paper can be considered as contributing to the larger
project that aims to construct a uniform semantics for question-embedding, currently
beingundertakenbyanumber of researchersworking in thedomain (e.g.,George2011;
Spector and Egré 2015; Uegaki 2015; Xiang 2016; Theiler et al. 2018). Although few
of the existing works specifically discuss the projection of the UP/EP, the discussion in
this paper reveals that it can be properly analyzed without any significant modification
to the overall semantics of question-embedding, oncewe assume that the answers carry
the UP/EP. In the body of the paper, this is concretely shown by taking Spector and
Egré’s (2015) theory of question-embedding. The current paper can be considered as
providing a heretofore missing piece of the overall semantics of question-embedding.
As mentioned in Sect. 3.4, I have largely left open the issue concerning the internal
composition of wh-complements, as I have focused on the analysis of the projection
of the UP/EP within the context of the investigation of the semantics of question-
embedding. However, it goes without saying that a more detailed investigation of the
internal composition of the wh-complement provides a clearer view of the source of
the UP/EP. In fact, in a recent paper, Hirsch and Schwarz (2019) argue that the UP
of singular-which questions originates from the semantics of which (in a way similar
to the picture I have suggested in Sect. 3.4) based on an observation that uniqueness
can take scope below a position where the answerhood operator would normally take
scope. It is possible that evidence from the embedding phenomena (as discussed in
this paper) and that from the internal composition of wh-complements (as discussed
by Hirsch and Schwarz 2019) converge to suggest that the UP/EP indeed originates
from the answers, more specifically, from the semantics of the wh-element.
A related open issue is the analysis of the presupposition of non-constituent ques-
tions, such as alternative questions. If the UP/EP is attributed to the semantics of
the wh-element, the presupposition of alternative questions (that exactly one of the
alternatives is true) has to be accounted for in a separate fashion, possibly in terms
of its intonation (e.g., Westera 2017). On the other hand, if the UP/EP is attributed
to an operator that attaches to interrogative complements in general (as considered
in Appendix A), a unified analysis of the presupposition of wh-complements and
alternative questions would be possible. We need further empirical and theoretical
investigation to properly compare the relative advantages of these two lines of analy-
sis.
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Appendix A: An alternative implementation
In the main text, I have provided an implementation of the analysis where each answer
of the embedded question caries the UP/EP. This, however, is not the only possible
implementation of the analysis. An alternative way to formulate the analysis is to
redefine Dayal’s Ans-operator so that the relevant answer involved in the semantics
of question-embedding always carries the UP/EP. A version of Ans redefined in such
a way, which I call Ans′, is given in (93b) below, together with the original definition
of Ans in (93a).
(93) a. Answ = λQ〈st,t〉 : ∃p ∈ Q[p = Maxinf(Q, w)]. Maxinf(Q, w)
b. Ans′w = λQ〈st,t〉 : ∃p ∈ Q[p = Maxinf(Q, w)].
λw′ : ∃p ∈ Q[p = Maxinf(Q, w′)]. Maxinf(Q, w)(w′)
The Ans′-operator presupposes that the ‘answer’ that it returns presupposes that
the input Q contains a maximally strong true answer.32 For example, when Q =
{ A, B,C } (where each proposition is independent from each other) and only A is
true in w, we have the following:
(94) Ans′w(Q) = λw′ : ∃p ∈ { A, B,C } [p = Maxinf({ A, B,C } , w′)]. A(w′)
That is, the answer Awith the presupposition that the original proposition-set contains
a maximally true answer.
Once we have this redefined version of the answerhood operator, the projection
behavior of the UP/EP can be captured in exactly the same ways as in the analysis
given in Sect. 3 of the main text. The other components of the analysis needed are
the same as in the case of the analysis in the main text: the existential semantics
for question-embedding (though defined in terms of Ans′ instead of Ans) and the
presuppositions of declarative-embedding sentences:
(95) The lexical rule generating question-embedding predicates
Vint = λQ〈st,t〉λxeλws : ∃w′[Vdecl(ExhQ(Ans′w′(Q)))(x)(w) is defined].
∃w′[Vdecl(ExhQ(Ans′w′(Q)))(x)(w) is defined ∧ Vdecl(Ans′w′(Q))(x)(w)]
(54) For all x , y, w and p,
a. knoww(x, p) is defined iff Doxxw ⊆ π(p) ∧ p(w)
b. certainw(x, p) is defined iff Doxxw ⊆ π(p)∧∃w′[w′ ∈ Doxxw∧p(w′)]
c. agreew(x, y, p) is defined iff Dox
x
w ⊆ π(p) ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ Doxyw →
p(w′)]
The projections of the UP/EP with know, be certain and agree are derived in exactly
the same manners as in (67), (71), (73) in Sect. 3.3.2. This is so because every time
we used Fact (65) to replace π(ExhQ(Answ′(Q))) with up in the derivations, we can
simply use the fact that ExhQ(Ans′w′(Q)) presupposes up (given the redefinedAns’)
to replace π(ExhQ(Answ′(Q))) with up.
32 The operator preserves the presupposition on Q (i.e., ∃p ∈ Q[p = Maxinf(Q, w)]) from the original
definition in order to guarantee that Maxinf(Q, w) is defined.
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More informally, the reason why the implementation in themain text and the imple-
mentation based on Ans’ don’t make distinct predictions regarding the projection
of the UP/EP can be stated as follows. In both implementations, the presupposition
of an interrogative-embedding sentence is analyzed in terms of Spector and Egré’s
(2015) lexical rule for question-embedding, which picks out a certain answer from
the question denotation employing the answerhood operator. In both implementa-
tions, the answer picked out by the lexical rule caries the UP/EP, which projects to
the sentential level in different ways depending on the embedding predicate. The
difference between the two implementations lies in how the answer picked out by
the lexical rule is guaranteed to carry the UP/EP. In analysis in Sect. 3, the answer
caries the UP/EP since all answers in the question denotation do. On the other
hand, in the analysis presented here, it does because of the redefined answerhood
operator Ans′.
Appendix B: An implementation within question-oriented semantics
Spector and Egré’s (2015) semantics for question-embedding assumes a proposition-
oriented semantics for question-embedding predicates. That is, it assumes that the
basic denotations of question-embedding predicates are proposition-taking ones, and
that a lexical rule is required to convert them into question-taking counterparts.
Uegaki (2015, 2016) and Theiler et al. (2018) offer a question-oriented semantics
for question-embedding predicates, which goes against Spector and Egré’s (2015)
assumption. According to this view, the basic denotation of a question-embedding
predicate takes a question (qua a set of propositions), and a declarative complement
is analyzed as providing a singleton proposition-set (or a downward-closed set of
propositions with only one maximal set, in the case of Theiler et al.). See Uegaki
(2019) for a review of existing empirical arguments for preferring the question-
oriented semantics over the proposition-oriented semantics for clause-embedding
predicates.
Although the analysis in themain text is stated in terms of Spector and Egré’s (2015)
lexical rule, the analysis is perfectly compatible with a question-oriented formulation.
This is so since the question-taking denotation of a predicate resulting from the lexical
rule can be considered as the basic denotation of the predicate, as exemplified below:
(96) a. know  λQ〈st,t〉λxeλws : ∃w′[knoww(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(x) is defined].
∃w′[knoww(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(x) is defined ∧ knoww(Answ′ (Q))(x)]
b. certain  λQ〈st,t〉λxeλws : ∃w′[certainw(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(x) is defined].
∃w′[certainw(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(x) is defined ∧ certainw(Answ′ (Q))(x)]
c. agree  λQ〈st,t〉λxeλyeλws : ∃w′[agreew(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(x)(y) is defined].
∃w′[agreew(ExhQ(Answ′ (Q)))(x)(y) is defined ∧ agreew(Answ′ (Q))(x)(y)]
Given these denotations, the UP/EP carried by each answer in Q is predicted to
project in the same way as in the analysis presented in Sect. 3, assuming the same
presupposition-projection properties for the meta-language predicates know, certain
and agree, as we have assumed in (54).
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Furthermore, the analysis makes correct predictions for the declarative-embedding
cases, once declarative complements are analyzed as having the singleton-set denota-
tion, as in (97). Given the above lexical entries for the embedding predicates, the VP
V that Ann smokes is translated as in (98).33
(97) that Ann smokes  {A}
(98) V that Ann smokes 
λxeλws : ∃w′[Vw(Exh{A}(Answ′({A})))(x) is defined].
∃w′[Vw(Exh{A}(Answ′({A})))(x) is defined ∧ Vw(Answ′({A}))(x)]
≡ λxeλws : ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ Vw(A)(x) is defined]. ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ Vw(A)(x)]
With the presuppositional properties of know, certain and agree, this results in the
following empirically adequate logical translations of the VP with the concrete pred-
icates:
(99) a. know that Ann smokes 
λxeλws : ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ knoww(A)(x) is defined]. ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ knoww(A)(x)]
≡ λxeλws : A(w). knoww(A)(x)
b. certain that Ann smokes 
λxeλws : ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ certainw(A)(x) is defined]. ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ certainw(A)(x)]
≡ λxeλws : ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ w′ ∈ Doxxw]. certainw(A)(x)
c. agree with Kim that Ann smokes 
λxeλws : ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ agreew(A)(k)(x) is defined]. ∃w′[A(w′) ∧ agreew(A)(k)(x)]
≡ λxeλws : ∃w′[Doxkw ⊆ A]. agreew(A)(k)(x)
In sum, although Spector and Egré’s (2015) semantics of question-embedding I
will adopt in the main text assumes the proposition-oriented semantics for embedding
predicates,my proposal is also compatiblewith the question-oriented semantics for the
relevant predicates, along the lines of Uegaki (2015, 2016) and Theiler et al. (2018).
Once we analyze the UP/EP as being carried by each answer of the question, the
question-oriented denotations for the predicates would predict the correct projection
pattern of the UP/EP. Furthermore, the analysis correctly captures the presupposition
of the declarative-embedding cases as well, in terms of the presuppositional properties
of the meta-language predicates.
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